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Abstract 
 
Recent work in cognitive and computational neuroscience depicts the human cortex as a 
multi-level prediction engine. This ‘predictive processing’ framework shows great 
promise as a means of both understanding and integrating the core information 
processing strategies underlying perception, reasoning, and action. But how, if at all, do 
emotions and sub-cortical contributions fit into this emerging picture? The fit, we shall 
argue, is both profound and potentially transformative. In the picture we develop, online 
cognitive function cannot be assigned to either the cortical or the sub-cortical 
component, but instead emerges from their tight co-ordination. This tight co-ordination 
involves processes of continuous reciprocal causation that weave together bodily 
information and ‘top-down’ predictions, generating a unified sense of what’s out there 
and why it matters. The upshot is a more truly ‘embodied’ vision of the predictive brain 
in action.  
 
 
1. The Strange Architecture of Predictive Processing 
 
In 2012 the AI pioneer Patrick Winston wrote about the “puzzling architecture” of the 
brain – an architecture in which “Everything is all mixed up, with information flowing 
bottom to top and top to bottom and sideways too.” He added, “ It is a strange 
architecture about which we are nearly clueless” (Winston, 2012). 
 
It is a strange architecture indeed. But that state of cluelessness is increasingly past. A 
wide variety of work – now spanning neuroscience, psychology, robotics and artificial 
intelligence is converging on the idea that one key role of that downward-flowing 
influence is to enable higher-levels to attempt (level-by-level, and as part of a multi-area 
cascade) to try to predict lower-level activity and responsei. That predictive cascade leads 
all the way to the sensory peripheries, so that the guiding task becomes the ongoing 
prediction of our own evolving flows of sensory stimulation. The idea that the brain is 
(at least in part, and at least sometimes) acting as some form of prediction engine has a 
long history, stretching from early work on perception (Helmholz, 1860; MacKay, 1956; 
Neisser, 1967; Gregory, 1980) all the way to recent work in deep learning (Hinton, 2007, 
2010). 
 
A promising subset of such work is the emerging family of approaches known as 
‘predictive processing’ ii . Predictive processing plausibly represents the last and most 
radical step in the long retreat (see Churchland et al., 1994) from a passive, feed-forward, 
input-dominated view of the flow of neural processing. According to this emerging class 
of models biological brains are constantly active, trying to predict the streams of sensory 
stimulation before they arrive. Systems like that are most strongly impacted by sensed 
deviations from their predicted states. It is these deviations from predicted states 
(prediction errors) that now bear much of the information-processing burden, informing 
us of what is newsworthy within the dense sensory barrage. When you see that steaming 
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coffee-cup on the desk in front of you, your perceptual experience reflects the multi-level 
neural guess that best reduces visual prediction errors. To visually perceive the scene, if 
this story is on track, your brain attempts to predict the scene, allowing the ensuing error 
(mismatch) signals to refine its guessing until a kind of equilibrium is achieved.  
 
To appreciate the benefits, first consider learning. Suppose you want to predict the next 
word in a sentence. You would be helped by knowledge of grammar. But one way to 
learn a surprising amount of grammar, as work on large-corpus machine learning clearly 
demonstrates, is to try repeatedly to predict the next word in a sentence, adjusting your 
future responses in the light of past patterns.  You can thus use the prediction task to 
bootstrap your way to the world-knowledge that you can later use to perform apt 
prediction. Importantly, learning using multi-level prediction machinery delivers a multi-scale 
grip on the worldly sources of structure in the sensory signal. In such architectures, 
higher levels learn to specialize in predicting events and states of affairs that are – in an 
intuitive sense – built up from the kinds of features and properties (such as lines, shapes, 
and edges) targeted by lower levels. But all that lower-level response is now modulated, 
moment-by-moment, by top-down predictionsiii.  
 
To make the best and most flexible use of the flow of prediction error PP architectures 
simultaneously estimate the so-called “precision” of the prediction error signal itself. 
Precision is the inverse variance of a prediction error signal – in other words, it sets error 
bars around an error signal according to its currently estimated importance or reliability. 
High-precision errors enjoy greater post-synaptic gain and (hence) increased influence. 
Conversely, even a large prediction error signal, if it is assigned extremely low precision, 
may be rendered systemically impotent, unable to drive learning or further processing. 
This enables different circumstances to render different prediction error signals 
important, and may mandate different balances between processing in different brain 
regions and between top-down prediction and incoming sensory evidence.  
 
Action itself is accomplished using the same resources. The core idea here (Friston et al, 
2010) is that there are two ways for brains to match their predictions to the world. Either 
find the prediction that best accounts for the current sensory signal (perception) or alter 
the sensory signal to fit the predictions (action). Importantly, the flow of action can itself 
be brought about, PP suggests, by a select sub-set of predictions – prediction of the 
(trajectory of) proprioceptive consequences that would ensue were the desired action to 
be performed. This turns out to be a computationally efficient way of implementing 
motor commands (Friston, 2011).  
 
A central claim of this 'active-inference' view is that top-down predictions and bodily 
actions co-evolve in circular and self-organizing ways. Friston and colleagues write, 
"Crucially, this inference or assimilation is active, in the sense that the internal states 
affect the causes of sensory input vicariously, through action. The resulting circular 
causality between perception and action fits comfortably with many formulations in 
embodied cognition and artificial intelligence; for example, the perception–action cycle 
[Fuster, 2004], active vision [Wurtz et al., 2011], the use of predictive information [Ay et 
al., 2008; Bialek et al., 2001; Tishby & Polani, 2010], and homeokinetic formulations 
[Soodak & Iberall, 1978]. Furthermore, it connects these perspectives to more general 
treatments of circular causality and autopoiesis in cybernetics and synergetics [Haken, 
1993], [Maturana & Varela, 1980]" (2014, p.443). 
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The resulting picture is one in which perception and action are complementary 
manifestations of a single adaptive regime, whose core operating principle is the 
reduction of precision-weighted prediction error. 
 
Adaptive predictions cannot, however, take shape in an organismic vacuum. What my 
brain predicts, moment-by-moment, needs to be delicately geared to what I need, and to 
what I need to be doing. And what I need, and what I need to be doing, are both matters 
that depend heavily upon both my current physiological states and the shape and 
progress of current world-engaging activity. It is here that sub-cortical structures, and 
especially the thalamus (and within it, the pulvinar) seem posed to play a special and 
crucial role. Understanding that role requires us to move beyond what Luiz Pessoa (2014, 
p 11) describes as the ‘corticocentric’ image in which evolutionary older subcortical 
structures are dominated and controlled  by the more recent cortical overlay. Instead, we 
will be led to endorse an ‘embedded’ view (op. cit., p.14) according to which cortical and 
sub-cortical states and activities change in a co-ordinated fashion characterized by 
ongoing patterns of mutual influence.  
 
 
2. Continuous Reciprocal Causation in Cortico-subcortical Loops 
 
The term cortical myopia was first coined by Josef Parvizi (2009) in reference to a lingering 
tendency in contemporary neuroscience to under-appreciate or to ignore the rich 
contributions sub-cortical brain regions make to higher cognitive function and intelligent 
behavior. The bias comes to us in part as a hangover from 19th century experimental 
brain research (see LeDoux, 1987). At the time human brain evolution was imagined to 
be a largely linear affair, with phylogenetically newer and more advanced cortical areas 
overlaying and controlling older more primitive subcortical areas (Herrick, 1933; Papez, 
1937). With higher cognitive functions such as language seen evolving alongside the 
massive expansion of the neocortex (Barton and Harvey, 2000) researchers naturally 
assumed higher cognition to be localized in the uppermost cortical tip of the neural axis. 
Together with Charles Darwin’s astute observations that basic emotions (eg. fear and 
rage) are shared across species, this led researchers to look for emotional/instinctual 
circuits in the older and highly conserved sub-cortex. Their conclusion was that human 
rationality emerged as the new and improved neocortex exerted increasing control over 
the outdated emotional-instinctual circuitry. As John Hughlings-Jackson wrote, “the 
higher nervous arrangements evolved out of the lower keep down those lower, just as a 
government evolved out of a nation controls as well as directs that nation” (Jackson, 
1884, p. 662, quoted by Parvizi, 2009, p. 354). This picture of the brain has produced a 
long-standing tradition in cognitive neuroscience of investigating cortical and sub-cortical 
structures as dichotomous sets of regions with “higher” circuits controlling/inhibiting 
the “lower” circuits (perhaps most dramatically in MacLean’s (1990) ‘triune’ brain 
model). 
 
The major issue with such corticocentric views is not that the brain might be usefully 
described in hierarchical terms (see Lewis and Todd, 2005), nor is it the claim that 
processing ‘higher’ up the neural axis is essential for cognitive functions such as decision 
making and language (which they most certainly are). What needs to be doubted is the 
assumption of a clear division of labor between a higher ‘cognitive brain’ and 
subordinate ‘emotional brain’ and the assumption that higher areas influences lower 
ones, but not the other way around. As neuroscientific techniques improve, it is 
becoming increasingly clear that such a dichotomous view of neural processing is too 
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simplistic to capture the complex, reciprocal and self-organizing nature of human brain 
function.  
 
Contrary to the Victorian view, the cortex is not a total newcomer to human brain 
evolution, but has in fact long been part of  the basic mammalian neural floor-plan 
(Pessoa, 2013). Moreover both cortex and sub-cortex have continued to change 
throughout human evolution. For example sub-regions of the human amygdala are 
believed to be 60% larger than apes’ relative to brain mass (Sherwood et al., 2012). 
Compare this with only a 24% increase in neocortical mass (Rilling and Insel, 1999), and 
surprisingly no significant increase in frontal lobe mass (Semendeferi et al., 2002). And 
finally there is growing evidence that cortical and sub-cortical areas evolved in a highly 
coordinated fashion, thereby producing rich looping interdependencies between lower 
emotional and higher cognitive circuits. A recent proposal by Chareyron and colleagues 
(2011) proposes that brain areas which are structurally or functionally interconnected 
evolve in tandem promoting increases in the convergence and integration of  information 
between the areas. A good example of  such coordinated cortical-sub-cortical growth 
comes from Barton (2012), who suggests that the increased size of  the primate 
cerebellum should be viewed in the context of  a three-way co-evolution between the 
diencephalon, cerebellum and the neocortex (see also Barton and Harvey, 2000). Pessoa 
(2014) makes a similar observation about the massive size increase in the primate 
amygdala and its remarkable connections (both afferent and efferent) to a wide variety of  
cortical and subcortical regions.  
 
The result of  this coordinated evolution has been the creation of  a rich embedding of  
neural circuitry in which newer circuits are continually woven into older ones producing 
novel functional landscapes stretching across the entire brain. As Pessoa writes, this 
interweaving “creates a web of  functional and structural couplings in a way that blurs 
“old” and “new”” (Pessoa, 2015, p. 49). One way to see this is to note that complex sub-
cortical dynamics now continuously influence, and are continuously influenced by, 
complex cortical dynamics. Such processes (of  ‘continuous reciprocal causation’ – see 
Clark (1997)) bind multiple ‘components’ into unified dynamic wholes in which the state 
variables of  one system are the parameters of  the other, and vice versaiv. Such complex 
couplings are characteristic of  evolved systems in which neural processing, bodily action, 
and environmental forces are constantly and complexly combined. In the case at hand, 
we shall see that sub-cortical systems are themselves constantly informed by bodily 
changes and our own ongoing actions, thus coupling neural predictions and bodily 
unfoldings in deep and transformative ways. 
 
 
3. Sampling the Coupling 
 
To put flesh on these teleo-functional speculations consider the huge number of 
subcortical structures that target cortical regions either directly or via the thalamus, 
including areas such as the basal forebrain (Dunnett et al., 1991), hypothalamus (Pessoa, 
2014), basal ganglia (Clarke et al., 2008), amygdala (Pessoa, 2013), cerebellum (Leiner et 
al., 1986), and brainstem via dopaminergic and noradrenergic systems (Parvizi and 
Damasio, 2000; Mather et al., 2016; Markovic et al., 2015). Many of these ascending 
systems form important reciprocal loops with the cortex. For example the basal ganglia is 
connected to the cortex by at least five separate circuits, some of which form closed 
loops with cortex via the thalamus. This allows information flowing from cortical areas 
to basal ganglia to return again to the same cortical area (Parvizi, 2009). As Parvizi writes, 
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the richness of this looping relationship means that “in reality, there is no cortex versus 
basal ganglia divide. One does not exist without the other, and there is only an 
interlinked network of corticostriatal loops” (op. cit. p.356). From this perspective, 
online cognitive function cannot be assigned to either the cortical or subcortical 
component, but instead emerges from their tight coordination.  
 
Work on the hypothalamus provides further examples of  the rich suite of  interactions 
weaving cortex and sub-cortex. In the past, researchers primarily focused on the 
hypothalamus' descending systems (connecting to brainstem and spinal cord), leading to 
its characterization as a homeostatic controller (Bard, 1928; Cannon, 1929). The 
hypothalamus also receives information from the body allowing it to finely tune affective 
responses to the environment (for a good discussion see Lewis and Todd, 2005). 
Recently however our understanding of  hypothalamic connectivity has expanded to 
include a rich set of  bidirectional pathways connecting to the whole cortical mantle 
(Risold, Thompson, Swanson, 1997). Contrary once again to the corticocentric vision, 
the hypothalamus appears to exert a large influence on cortical function both directly and 
indirectly via the thalamus, basal forebrain, amygdala and brainstem (all of  which are 
themselves bidirectionally connected to the cortex and each other (Pessoa, 2014). This 
makes the hypothalamus the second largest contributor to cortical inputs after the 
thalamus (Swanson, 2000). The reciprocal connectivity to both cortical areas and the 
internal body would allow the hypothalamus to synchronize huge flows of  information 
within the brain and body (Pessoa, 2013, p. 230–231). As Kiverstein and Miller have 
recently noted, “this coordination [facilitated by the hypothalamus] allows for cognitive 
and affective processes to be mobilized together allowing the animal to behave flexibly, 
and in ways that are adapted to the particularities of  a context of  activity” (Kiverstein 
and Miller, 2015). 
 
Finally, consider the profound reciprocal relationship that exists between prefrontal 
cortex and brainstem nuclei. The brainstem (and striatal) circuits are believed to play a 
central role in generating rapid emotional responses (the so called ‘action tendencies’ in 
Frijda's work; 1986) and so have been called the “seat of emotions” (Panksepp, 1998). 
Meanwhile the prefrontal cortex uses highly processed information from a variety of 
cortical areas to directly inhibit brainstem reactions thereby allowing time for more 
sophisticated, and context appropriate, behaviors to emerge. But once again, this is not a 
one-way relationship. Instead, systems in the brainstem also modulate the frontal lobes 
by way of neuromodulatory chemicals. Neuromodulatory systems producing dopamine, 
norepinephrine and acetylcholine within the brainstem, basal forebrain, hypothalamus 
have terminals in a huge portion of  both the sub-cortex and prefrontal areas (Arnsten & 
Li, 2005; Joels et al., 2006). Such neuromodulatory systems are believed to attune cortical 
processing to signals from the body and environment that are important for survival 
(Lewis and Todd, 2005). As they have recently written: 
 
“if not for the bottom-up flow, the brain would have no energy and no direction 
for its activities. If not for the top-down flow, recently evolved mechanisms for 
perception, action and integration would have no control over bodily states and 
behavior. It is the reciprocity of these upward and downward flows that links 
sophisticated cognitive processes with basic motivational mechanisms” (op. cit. 
p. 20). 
 
During complex behaviors, elements of emotion and cognition are thus so intermixed 
that a significant decomposition becomes impossible at the level of the brain (Pessoa, 
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2013). If a meaningful decomposition of emotion and cognition is indeed impossible, 
then processes considered to be emotional will be poised to play a much richer role than 
previously proposed (eg. influencing vision). Just such an account has recently been 
proposed, within the predictive processing framework, by Barrett and Bar (2009) – see 
also Barrett and Simmons (2015) and Chanes and Barrett (2016). 
 
With massive ascending and descending circuits the PFC becomes an important center 
of vertical integration of information (Pessoa, 2015). PFC along with related areas such 
as the orbitofrontal, cingulate and insula cortex are all richly interconnected with one 
another and with amygdala and hypothalamus both of which have huge influence over 
internal (affective) processes. This collection of areas has also recently been highlighted 
as part of the so called ’rich club’: a community of highly interconnected neural hubs that 
serve as the backbone for brain wide (cortical and subcortical) synchronizations (Van 
den Heuvel & Sporns, 2011, 2013a, 2013b; see also Chanes and Barrett (2016) for a good 
discussion on the relationship between rich clubs and predictive processing). This tight 
vertical integration of neural processing suggests that cognitive and emotional processes 
are strongly interdependent (Lewis, 2005; Stapleton, 2013; Pessoa, 2013; Colombetti, 
2014). In contrast to the corticocentric vision, cognition and behaviour are better seen as 
emerging from numerous systems stretching the entire neural axis and dynamically 
interacting via feed-forward and feed-backward loops (see Lewis, 2005 for a richly 
detailed account of this ebb and flow).  
 
 
4. A New Look at the Thalamus 
 
This picture of dense cortical-sub-cortical coupling is further enriched by new 
understandings of the thalamus itself. While traditionally described as a byway through 
which information was shuttled into the cortex, today the thalamus is now being re-
described as an important neural nexus point capable of orchestrating huge flows of 
cortical communication. As Pessoa writes, “corticothalamocortical information transfer 
may represent an important addition to, or even replacement of, the current dogma that 
corticocortical transfer of primary information exclusively involves direct corticocortical 
pathways" (Theyel et al., 2010) 
 
In just this vein, Sherman and Guillery (2013) argue that large amounts of thalamic 
connectivity are not simple way-stations or ‘first order’ relays,  conveying information to 
the cortex from some sub-cortical source such as the retina. Instead, most of the 
thalamus is said to be composed of ‘higher-order relays’: circuits that transmit 
information between cortical areas – specifically, from layer 5 of one cortical area to 
some other cortical area. This intriguing feature of the connectivity matrix is directly 
suggested by impressive bodies of physiological and anatomical evidence, reviewed and 
summarized by Sherman and Guillery It suggests that the primary role of much thalamic 
connectivity may be to mediate intra-cortical communication. If so, the question 
naturally arises, what are the differences in the kinds of information being carried by 
these various pathways? Here, it is notable that “the extra-thalamic targets of driversv to 
the thalamus seem to be involved in motor control” (Sherman, 2007, p.420). This opens 
up an intriguing possibility, which is that the information conveyed in cortico-thalamic-
cortical circuits may be profoundly entangled with unfolding motoric commands and 
activity. This possibility has been defended and explored by Guillery (2003, 2005), and is 
further refined by Sherman and Guillery (2013). On this speculative account, 
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transthalamic cortico-cortico pathways tend to transmit information about the motor 
consequences of current processing in that area. This means that: 
 
“at every level of sensory processing, perception is inextricably linked to ongoing 
instructions for action, prior to the action itself. ” Sherman and Guillery (2011, 
p.1073). 
 
Sherman and Guillery go on to suggest that the thalamus may thus play a role in 
establishing and maintaining transient action-specific dynamic couplings between cortical 
areas, and in alerting cortical areas to any unexpected motor instructions being computed 
by other areas (see Sherman and Guillery (2011) pp. 1074). The resulting picture is one in 
which “sensorimotor processing is unified throughout all levels of thalamo-cortical 
function” (op cit p. 1075). Processes of continuous reciprocal causation coupling cortical 
and thalamic sources here put higher-level prediction machinery in direct contact with 
unfolding bodily actions. But more importantly, they do so in ways that thus defy easy 
decomposition into ‘leader’ and ‘led’. Instead, bodily actions and complex top-down 
predictions co-evolve, delivering just the kinds of ‘circular causality’ between perception 
and action imagined by proponents of ‘active inference’ (see e.g. Friston, Adams et al 
(2012)).  
 
This emerging vision of the densely woven cortico-sub-cortical economy is essential, we 
will now argue, if we are to flesh out key aspects of the predictive processing story 
described earlier. In particular, it will help us understand both the power, and the 
implementation, of a key component of that story – the variable precision-weighting of 
prediction error.  
 
 
5. Precision and the Threat of Magic Modulation? 
 
PP accounts are distinguished, in part, by their pervasive reliance upon ‘precision 
estimations’ to perform a variety of key tasks and functions. Precision estimates, as 
mentioned earlier, track the inverse variance of the prediction error signal. In other 
words, they set error bars around different aspects of that signal according to their 
estimated reliability, given the task and context. Precise prediction error signals result in 
increased post-synaptic gain, driving further processing more strongly than their less 
precise cousins.  
 
There are two main (but deeply related) roles played by precision within the PP 
architecture.  First, and most generally, variable precision weighting alters the balance 
between top-down prediction and the incoming sensory signal, allowing us to rely on 
specific chunks of sensory evidence to a greater or lesser degree depending upon task 
and context. For example, on a clear but windy day, for many tasks, visual information 
remains highly accurate and reliable and should be given more weight than (say) smell. 
By varying the impact of specific aspects of prediction error upon further processing, PP 
systems achieve a remarkable degree of flexibility in their use of long-term stored 
knowledge about the world. In the case of the McGurk effect (see McGurk and 
McDonald, 1976) for example, we allow visual information from a mismatched, 
overdubbed video of a speaking face to overwhelm some aspects of the auditory signal, 
resulting in our mishearing ‘ba’ as ‘da’. This makes ecological sense since lip movements 
are normally an excellent cue to speech sounds, and we must often rely upon them in 
situations of noise or uncertainty. 
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Second, precision determines the nature of control. For example, Pezzulo et al. (2015) 
leverage the precision estimation mechanism as a means of ‘flipping’ between habitual 
and more reflective means of control. Habitual control emerges when sensory prediction 
error is rapidly resolved at lower levels of the processing hierarchy. More reflective 
means of control emerge when prediction error is resolved at higher levels – levels that 
contextualize lower-level responses. In this way: 
 
“the ontology of behavioural paradigms in associative learning can be seen as a 
successive contextualisation of more elemental sensorimotor constructs, within 
generative models of increasing hierarchical depth” Pezzulo, Rigoli, and Friston 
(2015, p.18) 
 
Higher-level representations here entrain systemic response over longer time-scales, by 
predicting – and hence helping to bring about - more complex sequences of responses 
and environmental (or bodily) states. Influential work on ‘multiple controllers’ for 
habitual (model-free) versus goal-directed (model-based) response is here accommodated 
within a single precision-modulated inferential schema in which: 
 
“it is the precision or reliability of alternative controllers that arbitrates their 
relative contribution” (op cit p. 19) 
 
High precision predictions exert greater force, and when those predictions originate from 
much higher levels, they entrain prospective forms of control – forms of control that 
anticipate and help bring about extended sequences of inputs so as to implement choices 
and policies concerning future actions. This is the domain that is sometimes referred to 
as ‘counterfactual prediction’ – prediction that is truly oriented towards the future, and 
concerns states of affairs that do not yet obtain. Control is thus: 
 
 “not dichotomized into two discrete systems [habitual and model-based], but 
viewed as distributed along a graded continuum going from the highest levels of 
abstract, prospective and conscious reasoning to more concrete, short-sighted 
unconscious levels of reasoning down to the arc reflex”. (op cit p.24) 
 
This picture can be enriched in various ways, for example by noting that habitual control 
(here, the resolution of high-precision prediction errors using only lower-levels of the 
processing regime) may sometimes itself extend over larger time-scales, as in the case of 
highly skilled, over-learnt sports performances. But for present purposes, what matters is 
simply the pervasive role of precision estimation in supporting flexible, context-sensitive 
responses that seamlessly negotiate a smooth continuum between more-or-less 
‘automatic’ and goal-directed modes. Behaviour, if these accounts are on track, is 
contextualized by different hierarchical levels in ways that are arbitrated (op cit p.27) by 
precision dynamics. Precision here performs two distinct yet inter-related functions. It 
determines which areas and hierarchical levels currently exert most control. And it 
“reports opportunities to achieve a goal” (op cit p.28) by reflecting current confidence in 
those opportunities, and also by responding to signs of progress or failure.   
 
In order to perform these functions adequately, variations in precision-estimation must 
be delicately responsive to an interacting medley of exteroceptive, interoceptive, and 
proprioceptive sensory signals. For what goals we pursue, what actions we perform, 
which aspects of behavior can safely be left to habitual control, and which demand 
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higher-level contextualization, are all matters that require the simultaneous satisfaction of 
multiple kinds of constraint. Are we in physical danger? Are we hungry, or likely to 
become hungry if we do not take precautionary action? Is there a sudden opportunity to 
fulfill a long-standing goal? Is our body currently able to reach some desired target? Do 
we have enough information to make a good call on whether or not to pursue a certain 
goal, or should we instead act so as to harvest additional information? Delicate waves of 
precision-engineered influence must reflect our brain’s best task-and-context reflecting 
guesses about all these matters, modulating the impact of every aspect of the prediction 
error signal so as to soft-assemble neuronal resources into temporary webs that keep us 
viable and that enable us to achieve our goals.  
 
Such spectacular fluidity might raise suspicions.  It can sometimes seem as if precision-
variation is playing the role of a ‘magic modulator’, putatively altering the balances of 
internal power so as to allow the PP framework to accommodate every conceivable form 
of adaptive behavior, from simple reflexes, to the most complex goal-driven unfoldings. 
Have we inadvertently imported an un-explanatory free variable into our explanatory 
schema? We believe that the threat of magic modulation can be averted once we better 
appreciate the role of sub-cortical processing in the estimation, orchestration and 
distribution of precision.  
 
 
6. Sub-cortical Contributions to Precision Estimation 
 
Implemented by multiple means in the brain (such as neurotransmitter-based 
modulation, and temporal synchronies between neuronal populations) flexible precision-
weighting renders these architectures spectacularly fluid and context-responsive. Sub-
cortical contributions affords further opportunities to incorporate constantly updated 
information about the state of the body and its readiness for action, and about the 
uncertainties associated with the bodily information itself. 
 
For example, Kanai et al. (2015) suggest that thalamic nuclei weight precision in the 
visual cortex. More specifically, their account focuses on the pulvinar. The pulvinar 
complex is the largest mass in primate thalamus and connects to a wide variety of cortical 
and subcortical areas via thalamocortical loops. It has extensive bidirectional connections 
with visual, temporal, parietal, cingulate, frontal and insular cortices, as well as the 
amygdala. As Pessoa writes, “at a gross level, it is as if the entire convoluted cortex were 
‘shrink-wrapped’ around the pulvinar” (2014, p.11). This massive connectivity provides 
the pulvinar with ample opportunity to modulate the flow of information across much of 
the brain.  
 
Kanai et al.'s proposal is that a key task of the pulvinar is to alter the influence (gain) of 
specific cortically-computed prediction errors so as to reflect their estimated precision. 
Such a sub-cortical contribution would be a prime instance of deep (cortico-sub-cortical) 
neural embedding. Core computations performed by the cortex would here be sensitively 
and constantly modulated by information about the state of the body and unfolding 
actions, as registered by the sub-cortical nexus. These gain alterations would, in turn, 
impact the flow of moment-by-moment cortico-cortico communication, routing and re-
routing flows of information and control as task and context unfold. The pulvinar, Kania 
et al suggest, is both architecturally well-suited and anatomically well-situated to perform 
this role.  
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This has quite radical implications. Because many subcortical circuits are tightly 
coordinated with internal bodily processes (vascular, visceral, endocrine, autonomic) 
information from the body turns out to play a much more important role than that 
assumed by the corticocentric vision of the brain. A particularly important function that 
requires this integration is the evaluation of (and motoric response to) sensory 
information. This is the bodily-sub-cortical-cortical weave that “addresses the question: 
given the present sensory information and the organism’s present internal state, how 
should it act?" (Pessoa, 2008 p.150).  
 
Consider vision. What has been called the standard account of vision assumes a division 
of labor between a 'high-road' ascending from the retina through the visual cortex in a 
(mostly) hierarchical manner, and a 'low road' that fast-tracks affectively salient visual 
information from retina through the superior colliculus and pulvinar to the amygdala 
thereby helping to produce quick survival behaviors. The subcortical pathway is typically 
referred to in order to help explain the fast reaction time emotionally salient information 
produces in the brain and body (Pessoa, 2013). Many such dual-systems models exist, 
proposing two competing (or sometimes cooperating) routes: a faster, automatic, 
emotional, subcortical route, and a slower, controlled, cognitive, cortical route (e.g. 
Kahneman, 2003; Stanovich & West, 2000). These models remain both ‘cognitivist’ and 
corticocentric insofar as they assume emotional processing takes place entirely sub-
cortically, and often in a way that is completely insulated from so ‘higher’ processes such 
as awareness and attention (believed to be processed cortically). They are also myopic in 
so far as they are blind to the wealth of subcortical contributions to perception. To help 
map this more complex process Pessoa describes in detail six circuits (not meant to be 
exhaustive) that work to fold value into cognition and behaviour by biasing cortical 
processing towards patterns that are important for the organism's survival. They include 
the amygdala, cortical valuation regions such as the OFC and insula, fronto-parietal 
attentional networks, basal forebrain and reticular nucleus, and the pulvinar.  
 
Of particular importance for present purposes is the novel role Pessoa and colleagues 
propose for the pulvinar nucleus. Citing a wealth of experimental evidence and neuro-
anatomical data, Pessoa suggests abandoning the standard view of pulvinar as a simple 
subcortical by-way by which affectively salient signals are fast tracked from retina to 
amygdala (Pessoa, 2013). He offers in its place a detailed account of how the pulvinar 
biases visual processing towards signals that have emotional or motivational significance 
in part by way of its rich looping relationship with multiple cortical and sub-cortical 
areas. 
 
Importantly, the pulvinar is connected with the entire cortical mantle (Shipp, 2003). 
Kanai and colleagues focus primarily on the inferior portion of the pulvinar which is 
connected with striate and extrastriate cortex (targeting all 20-30 visual areas). However 
the lateral and medial pulvinar are richly connected to many other cortical and 
subcortical regions. The lateral pulvinar connects to temporal and parietal lobes (as well 
as portions of extrastriate cortex), and the medial pulvinar connects to the parietal, 
frontal, orbital, cingulate and insular cortex and amygdala. Many of these areas in turn 
have rich bidirectional relationships with visual cortex as we saw above (including the 
OFC and amygdala). The medial pulvinar here modulates the flow of multimodal 
information between a huge collection of cortical and sub-cortical areas including OFC, 
AIC, ACC, and amygdala believed to be of central importance in determining the 
affective value of signals and preparing the organism to respond appropriately (Pessoa 
and Adolphs 2010). In this way the medial pulvinar is proposed to amplify weak or 
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fleeting signals that have biological value thereby producing greater behavioural 
responses (Pessoa 2014, p.72). This optimal positioning and rich interconnectivity allows 
the pulvinar to fold value into the action-perception system in ways that respect these 
affective valuations.  
 
This may be a good moment to respond briefly to an important pair of issues raised by 
an anonymous referee. The first is: why do we take predictive processing (rather than 
some other theory) to be good candidate for a theoretical account of sub-cortical-cortical 
connectivity? The second – closely related – is whether the complex dynamical story we 
favor, replete as it is with complex looping influence and couplings, is actually consistent 
with the fundamental tenets of predictive processing anyway. Both these issues resolve 
once it is appreciated that our fundamental claim is that sub-cortical processing plays a 
major role in delivering the evolving flow of precision estimation essential to fluid and 
task-optimized cortical processing. Such precision estimations lie at the very heart of the 
predictive processing machine, sculpting the moment-by-moment flow of information in 
the brain. Their role , recall, is to enable contextual information to reconfigure the 
impact of any area or level upon any other area or level according to the changing details 
of task and of inner and outer context. Our suggestion, in line with Kanai et al (2015) is 
that these precision estimations are, to a surprising extent, sub-cortically mediated. This 
is what keeps them in touch (as they need to be) with both the ongoing flow of 
embodied action and the changing physiological state of the organism. It was not our 
aim, however, to present evidence  that predictive processing is the best story about 
cortico-sub-cortical connectivity. Rather, we assume (for the purposes of the paper) that 
the predictive processing story is worth pursuing in general, and ask how sub-cortical 
influence might fit into the story. The fit, we argued, is excellent – such connectivity is in 
fact ideally placed to carry out the important task of embodied-action-based precision 
modulation. The upshot is that we should expect to find subtle looping dynamics 
whereby precision-weighted prediction error both reflects and enables ongoing action – 
the kinds of circular dynamics rightly foregrounded in traditional dynamical systems 
approaches. To fully appreciate the potential significance of this complex interaction, we 
next locate affect where it belongs – as a reflection of changing states of organismic 
readiness for action. 
 
 
7. Affect and Action-Readiness 
 
Cisek (2007) was the flagship treatment of the so-called ‘affordance competition’ 
hypothesis, according to which: 
 
“the brain processes sensory information to specify, in parallel, several potential 
actions that are currently available. These potential actions compete against each 
other for further processing, while information is collected to bias this 
competition until a single response is selected” Cisek (2007) p.1585. 
 
The brain, so the story goes, is constantly computing, or starting to compute, a large set 
of possible actions. These possible actions (which are essentially states of partial ‘action 
readiness’) are computed constantly and in parallel. They are also, as Cisek and Kalaska 
(2011, p. 279) put it, ‘pragmatic’ insofar as “they are adapted to produce good control as 
opposed to producing accurate descriptions of the sensory environment or a motor 
plan”. All this makes good ecological sense, allowing time-pressed animals to partially 
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‘pre-compute’ multiple possible actions, any one of which can then be selected, 
completed, and deployed at short notice and with minimal further processing. 
 
In line with such a view, Hoshi and Tanji (2007) found activity in monkey premotor 
cortex correlated with the potential movements of either hand in a bimanual reaching 
response task in which the monkey had to wait upon a cue signaling which hand to use. 
Similar results have been obtained for the preparation of visual saccades (Powell and 
Goldberg, 2000) and using behavioral and lesion studies of reaching behavior in human 
subjects (Humphreys and Riddoch, 2000; Castiello, 1999). Decision-making seems to be 
folded right into these densely interanimated loops so that, to a certain degree at least, 
“decisions about actions emerge within the same populations of cells that define the 
physical properties of those actions and guide their execution” (Cisek and Kalaska, 2011, 
p. 282).  
 
Emotion belongs at the very heart of this embodied nexus. As processing proceeds, 
affect and content must be co-computed: intertwined (Barrett & Bar (2009))  
within the process of settling upon a coherent, action-guiding interpretation of the scene.  
Sub-cortical mechanisms that assign precisions to cortically computed quantities seem 
ideally suited to the implementation of such affectively-informed affordance competition 
in the brain. The sub-cortical loops here keep ‘higher-level’ prediction systems constantly 
in touch with our evolving actions, Consistent with such a picture, Frijda (1986, 2007) 
proposes that affect itself reports on embodied action-readiness programs that 
simultaneously indicate the relationship between the organism and the environment, and 
motivate the organism to improve that relationship. As Frijda writes, "emotion, by its 
very nature, is change in action readiness to maintain or change one’s relationship to an 
object or event” (Frijda, 2004, p. 158). Frijda’s account thus slots neatly into place with 
the work of Barrett and Bar (2009), Lewis and Todd (2005) and Pessoa (2015) discussed 
earlier. The common theme is that affect reports on action-readiness, revealing 
cognition, emotion, and action as inextricably entwined . 
 
Our speculative story – or better, story sketch - is now complete. The broad connectivity 
of the medial and lateral pulvinar allows it to integrate various streams of information 
including affect (insula), action (cingulate), value (OFC) and cognition/attention 
(frontoparietal). Such thalamocortical loops work to amplify weak or fleeting signals that 
have biological value thereby producing greater behavioral responses (Pessoa 2014, p.72). 
Sub-cortically orchestrated precision weighting thus emerges as a potent (and notably 
non-magical) tool for modulating bodily response, affect, and action. By fully weaving in 
sub-cortical contributions, we arrive at a  vision of a brain permeated by affect, 
constantly preparing the organism for actionvi.  
 
 
8. Conclusions: Coupling the Active Body and the Predictive Brain 
 
If cortico- sub-cortical weave plays the roles we are suggesting, the consequences for our 
understanding of prediction, perception, and action are profound. On the one hand, 
attention to this delicate multi-dimensional weave should help allay a major worry about 
the PP approach – the worry that too many puzzles and problems are being solved by 
the blanket appeal to context- variable precision assignments. For that blanket appeal, it 
may now be hoped, may be cashed out in many different ways, that make the most of 
these (relatively newly- discovered) properties of multiple interacting cortico- sub-cortical 
loops. In particular, we argued that reflection of the role of the medial pulvinar highlights 
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the role thalamocortical loops play in directing various flows of information towards 
what is affectively salient.  
 
The resulting  picture is profoundly ‘embodied’ insofar as mutual couplings (with the full 
dynamical signature of continuous reciprocal causation) obtain between body, sub-
cortex, and cortex, with sub-cortical (specifically thalamic) nuclei serving to bring bodily 
information constantly into the mix. These sub-cortical loops help influence precision 
estimations in ways that reflect bodily states and unfolding actions, allowing value (to the 
organism) and affect (relating to interocepted bodily states) to exert a continuous 
influence on high-level predictions, that themselves exert a continuous influence on 
bodily states and unfolding actions.  
 
What begins to emerge is a richer vision of the predictive brain itself. Our neural 
prediction engines are fundamentally in the business of preparing the organism for 
action, courtesy of  constant sub-cortically mediated two-way communication with bodily 
unfoldings. In this way we construct an affect-laden experiential world that is as much 
about our own changing needs as it is about the state of a mind-independent realityvii. 
Mind like these are thoroughly permeated by emotion and by readiness for action.  
Emotion, cognition, and preparation for action here form a single whole, self-organized 
around precision weighted, prediction-error minimizing interactions that span cortical 
and sub-cortical circuits. These interactions couple the active body to the predictive 
brain. 
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ii For this usage, see Clark (2013).  
iii This helps make sense of recent work showing that top-down effects (expectation and 
context) impact processing even in early visual processing areas such as V1- see Petro et 
al (2014) Petro and Muckli (2016).  Recent work in cognitive neuroscience has begun to 
suggest some of the detailed ways in which biological brains might implement such 
multi-level prediction machines – see Bastos et al (2012). 
iv See Clark (2014) chapter 7. 
v A driver is traditionally distinguished from a modulator.  Drivers, as the name suggests, 
are seen as primary transmitters of information whereas modulators alter the impact of 
that information. Driver inputs to a thalamic relay are thus diagnostic of the function of 
that relay, whereas modulator inputs are not - see Sherman and Guillery (2011). Within 
PP, precision-weighting acts a kind of universal modulator. 
vi This is a contemporary version of the profoundly ‘motocentric’ vision of the brain 
suggested in the classic work by Churchland et al (1994). 
vii Such a perceptual realm is constructed in a fashion that is deeply ‘narcissistic’ in exactly 
the sense of Akins (2006).  
